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ABSTRACT 
Problems of racial discrimination in the imposition of capital sentences, disclosure of 
misconduct by prosecutors and police, inconsistency in the quality of defense 
afforded capital defendants, exoneration of death row inmates due to newly available 
DNA testing, and, most recently, controversies surrounding the potential for cruelty 
in the execution process itself continue to complicate views about the morality, 
legality, and practicality of reliance on capital punishment to address even the most 
heinous of homicide offenses. Despite repeated efforts by the Supreme Court to craft 
a capital sentencing framework that ensures that death sentences be imposed fairly in 
light of the offenses committed and character of the offenders, perhaps the most 
profound questioning about capital punishment policy has come from within the 
Court itself. Capital punishment remains a difficult problem both in terms of 
constitutional criminal procedure and sound public policy. It will likely remain so for 
some time to come based on the Court’s unwavering commitment to its implicit 
holding in Furman v. Georgia that execution does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he forty-year history of the Supreme Court’s capital punishment 
jurisprudence, set in place by its decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 
has been marked by a determined intervention in the administration of 
the death penalty. The Court’s continuing interest in reviewing death 
sentences has, in a very real sense, touched on virtually every aspect of 
the criminal process2 and has reshaped concepts underlying the very 
heart of the capital punishment debate.3 In Furman, the Supreme Court 
essentially voided all existing state capital punishment statutes only a 
year after it had generally upheld the death penalty in the companion 
                                           
1 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that prosecutors have 
a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense); Holmes v. South Carolina, 
547 U.S. 319 (2006) (discussing the rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence indicating another’s guilt); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) 
(establishing an indigent’s right to assistance of forensic expert); Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (establishing that the admission of a coerced 
confession as “trial error” is subject to the harmless error test); Turner v. 
Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (establishing a right to voir dire jurors as to racial 
bias in interracial capital case); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) 
(remanding for consideration of due process issues due to prosecutor’s use of 
inconsistent theories in pursuing death penalty against co-defendant in severed 
trial); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (overturning death penalty where 
counsel failed to examine prosecutor’s file on defendant’s prior conviction 
admitted at capital sentencing hearing); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) 
(holding that it was improper to shackle the defendant at capital sentencing 
hearing). 
3 For instance, one of the critical questions regarding the constitutionally 
acceptable use of capital sentences has involved the imposition of the death 
penalty for rape. As death was an acceptable alternative penalty for rape and 
other serious felonies at the common law, it informed considerations of the 
scope of capital punishment in light of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of 
“cruel and unusual” punishment. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Nonetheless, the Court held early 
on in the post-Furman capital punishment revival that imposition of a death 
sentence for rape of an adult woman offended proportionality protections. See 
id. at 600. The question of constitutional prohibition against the imposition of 
the death penalty for the rape of a child, even when State statutory criteria for 
determining when the capital sentence may be appropriate exists, was addressed 
much later in Kennedy v. Louisiana, with the majority holding that the 
imposition of death where life was not taken was impermissible. 554 U.S. 407, 
421 (2008). 
T 
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cases of McGautha v. California and Crampton v. Ohio.4 In these 
cases, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice John Marshall 
Harlan during his last term on the Court, rejected an attack based upon 
the unguided exercise of discretion in imposing a death sentence by 
the capital sentencing authority5 whether jury or judge.6 The changing 
view, reflected in the rejection of the Georgia7 and Texas8 capital 
murder statutes by the Furman Court, corresponded with a dramatic 
and historic change in the Court’s composition,9 as the four Furman 
                                           
4 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g denied, McGautha v. California, 406 U.S. 978 
(1972), but vacated in part and reh’g granted, Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 
(1972) (remanding to the Supreme Court of Ohio insofar as the imposition of the 
death penalty was undisturbed, to be disposed of in light of Furman). 
5 The majority upheld the California process in which the jury exercised its 
discretion to impose a capital sentence without statutory criteria guiding its 
exercise of discretion. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207–08. While finding no federal 
constitutional requirement for the employment of criteria by which to channel 
the sentencing jury’s discretion, the majority noted the proposed capital 
sentencing approach taken in the Model Penal Code which provides specific 
direction to capital juries regarding the circumstances under which imposing the 
death penalty is warranted. Id. at 221–25. The companion case to McGautha, 
Crampton v. Ohio, questioned whether the unitary trial in which the jury 
considered the questions of guilt and punishment in a single proceeding violated 
due process. Id. at 192. 
6 Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in both cases. Id. at 226. In 
Justice Douglas’ dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, he 
argued that the unitary trial system in place in Ohio unfairly compromised 
Crampton’s right to testify in support of his punishment case by subjecting him 
to cross-examination on matters that would otherwise not have been heard by 
the jury on the question of his guilt. Id. at 239 (“That ‘undeniable tension’ 
between two constitutional rights . . . should lead to a reversal here. For the 
unitary trial or single-verdict trial in practical effect allows the right to be heard 
on the issue of punishment only by surrendering the protection of the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). In Justice Brennan’s dissent, in 
which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined, he argued that the capital 
sentencing procedures used in both California and Ohio violated due process by 
failing to provide standards or criteria to guide the discretion of the sentencing 
authority in determining whether to impose the death sentence. Id. at 248, 251–
52. 
7 Furman was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 252 (1972). In a companion case, Jackson v. Georgia, the 
petitioner was convicted of rape under Georgia law and sentenced to death. Id. 
8 Id. at 239 (discussing the Texas statute in Branch v. Texas, a companion case to 
Furman, which authorized the death penalty for rape). 
9 The dramatic shift in the Justices’ views on capital punishment evident in the 
McGautha/Furman sequence is not adequately explained by a changing 
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dissenters—Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and 
William Rehnquist—had all been recent appointees of President 
Richard Nixon.10 During the tenure of Chief Justice Burger the Court 
both retreated from11 and expanded upon the well-known progressive 
posture set by the Warren Court in the field of criminal procedure.12 
The Warren Court’s posture reflected concerns that violations of civil 
rights of African-Americans were often most readily exposed in the 
context of the criminal justice system.13 
II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
The rejection of existing capital sentencing schemes by the five-
vote plurality in Furman did not serve the ultimate goal of 
abolitionists. Instead, within four years, newly drafted and adopted 
                                                                                                   
composition of the Court however, since Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and 
Marshall, members of the Furman plurality, all served on the Court in both 
cases. For discussions of the unusual shift in the Court’s position on capital 
punishment over consecutive terms, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman 
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (2007), and Robert A. Burt, 
Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1741, 1754–62 (1987). 
10 Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in 
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 896 (2008) (“While 
President Nixon’s four Supreme Court appointments did not emerge as 
consistently conservative picks, on balance, they moved the Court in a more 
conservative direction.”). 
11 The Court’s conservative turn during the tenure of Chief Justice Burger 
prompted publication of one of the most influential law review articles, William 
J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977), in which Justice Brennan argued that litigants should 
rely on state constitutional protections in order to avoid retrenchment on federal 
constitutional protections by conservative elements within the Court. See id. at 
501. 
12 While Chief Justice Burger joined much of the retreat from the Warren Court 
initiatives, he also occasionally advanced them in a significant way. For 
example, in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), he wrote the majority 
opinion recognizing the right of an accused to interlocutory appeal for review of 
a prior jeopardy claim to avoid “the personal strain, public embarrassment, and 
expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same offense.” Id. at 661. 
13 E.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478–479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“It is important to recall what motivated Members of this Court at the genesis 
of our modern capital punishment case law. Furman v. Georgia was decided in 
an atmosphere suffused with concern about race bias in the administration of the 
death penalty—particularly in Southern States . . . .”). 
2013 Furman, after Four Decades 169 
capital punishment statutes were before the Court.14 These post-
Furman statutes were designed to address the concerns of Justices 
Potter Stewart and Byron White, who had joined in the Furman 
judgment and focused on the infrequency and apparent random use of 
the death penalty, rather than holding that the death penalty itself could 
not be constitutionally imposed.15 
Though the Court rejected many mandatory capital sentencing 
statutes, which were often the result of states’ legislative efforts to 
comply with Furman,16 the Court upheld capital sentencing schemes in 
the 1976 decisions in Gregg v. Georgia,17 Proffitt v. Florida,18 and 
Jurek v. Texas.19 These schemes in these cases limited the range of 
homicides for which a death sentence could be imposed, and required 
consideration of the offender’s character and individual circumstances 
when determining whether a death sentence was appropriate. The 
approval of state capital sentencing schemes that allowed sentencing 
authorities to impose death only after considering mitigating factors 
served to justify the imposition of non-capital sentences when 
balanced against factors supporting death and led to a series of 
decisions requiring the broad admissibility of mitigating circumstances 
evidence. 
The Court has consistently upheld the right of capital defendants to 
offer evidence of circumstances that mitigates their culpability or that 
                                           
14 See cases cited infra notes 17–20. 
15 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“[T]hese sentences are ‘unusual’ in the sense that the penalty of death is 
infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is 
extraordinarily rare.”); id. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring) (“executed 
defendants are finally and completely incapacitated from again committing rape 
or murder or any other crime. But when imposition of the penalty reaches a 
certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing 
general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied.”). 
16 E.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637–
38 (1977) (holding mandatory death sentence for murder of police officer 
unconstitutional); Summer v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82–85 (1987) (holding 
unconstitutional a Nevada statute imposing mandatory death sentence for an 
inmate who commits murder while under life sentence); Williams v. Oklahoma, 
428 U.S. 907 (1976) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsideration in 
light of Woodson). 
17 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
18 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
19 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
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warrants a sentence other than death.20 For those defendants for whom 
mitigating circumstances result in rejection of capital punishment, the 
individualized sentencing considerations imposed in the Court’s 
jurisprudence is undeniably favorable. But over time the Court’s 
micromanagement of state capital sentencing procedures to ensure 
consideration of mitigating circumstances evidence in deciding 
punishment necessarily led to a rather curious consistency problem, as 
noted by Justice Antonin Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Walton v. 
Arizona21: 
Since the individualized determination is a unitary one (does this 
defendant deserve death for this crime?) once one says each 
sentencer must be able to answer “no” for whatever reason it 
deems morally sufficient (and indeed, for whatever reason any one 
of 12 jurors deems morally sufficient), it becomes impossible to 
claim that the Constitution requires consistency and rationality 
among sentencing determinations to be preserved by strictly 
limiting the reasons for which each sentencer can say “yes.” In 
fact, randomness and “freakishness” are even more evident in a 
system that requires aggravating factors to be found in great detail, 
since it permits sentencers to accord different treatment, for 
whatever mitigating reasons they wish, not only to two different 
                                           
20 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607–08 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a statute 
which permitted the sentencer to consider only those mitigating factors 
enumerated in the statute); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–17 (1982) 
(holding that capital defendant must be permitted to offer evidence relating to 
childhood circumstances which could reasonably influence emotional 
development); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (ruling that the 
defendant’s record of behavior while previously imprisoned or jailed pending 
capital trial admissible); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (holding 
that evidence of mental impairment due to developmental disabilities is 
admissible as mitigating factor in capital sentencing, but execution of mentally 
impaired was not per se cruel and unusual). Penry was eventually overruled on 
substance in Atkins v. Virginia when the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded, leaving open the degree of 
impairment that must be shown to avoid the imposition of the death penalty. 536 
U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002). Instances of less significant impairment would still 
require consideration as mitigating circumstances. 
21 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that after a determination of guilt has been 
made, a judge’s singular determination of the presence or absence of 
aggravating factors in death penalty sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury in capital prosecutions). Justice Scalia’s history of the Court’s 
Furman jurisprudence is far more comprehensive than attempted here. See 
Walton, 497 U.S.at 656–76. 
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murderers, but to two murderers whose crimes have been found to 
be of similar gravity.22 
Justice Scalia correctly identifies a persistent problem with the Court’s 
capital sentencing jurisprudence: the virtually unlimited reliance on 
mitigating circumstances, or evidence suggesting that mitigation is 
warranted, permits some capital defendants whose offenses mirror 
those committed by others similarly situated, to escape the death 
penalty based upon factors that lead capital jurors to reject death. For 
Justice Scalia, the Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence has resulted in 
an essentially irrational approach to solving the problems identified by 
Justices Stewart and White in Furman. 
The statistics regarding the actual use of the death penalty, 
particularly in terms of executions, bears out the perception that after 
some thirty-five years of Court-directed innovation, the landscape of 
capital punishment is much the same as it was when Furman was 
decided in 1972.23 The execution record for the thirty-three states that 
impose capital punishment, the federal government, and the United 
States military, collectively the thirty-five jurisdictions in which a 
death sentence is an authorized punishment for murder, shows just 
how sporadic and freakish capital sentencing remains.24 For the past 
several years, executions nationally are running at about fifty per 
year.25 Since Furman, the greatest total number of executions in any 
year was ninety-eight in 1999.26 
The overall problem implicit in the Court’s direct and indirect 
architecture developed to limit the number of homicides found to 
warrant death sentences quite simply, is that the universe of eligible 
offenses and offenders has limited both the potential and actual 
imposition of capital sentences. In short, the Court’s process of 
refining capital sentencing has, at its threshold, imposed significant 
restrictions on the use of capital sentencing, which in turn has caused 
its use to be more sporadic and, perhaps, more freakish than would 
have proved acceptable to the aims of Justices Stewart27 and White28 
in their Furman concurring opinions.29 
                                           
22 Id. at 666–67. 
23 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2012), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1 (46 in 2010, 43 in 2011, and 43 in 2012). 
26 Id. 
27 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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III. JUDICIAL RETROSPECTION: THE FLAWED SYSTEM OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 
Whether Justices Stewart and White would today rethink their 
positions in post-Furman cases upholding state death sentencing 
schemes, in light of their experience, is arguable. However, two 
Furman dissenters ultimately repudiated their support for capital 
sentencing. Justice Lewis Powell, who had argued against Justice 
William O. Douglas’ Furman conclusion that capital punishment 
could not be employed without misuse directed at minorities,30 wrote 
the opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp.31 There, the majority rejected an 
attack on Georgia’s capital punishment system based on statistical 
evidence that showed that death sentences were more frequently 
imposed on black capital defendants and an even higher percentage 
were imposed in cases where the victims were white.32 The Court held 
that the apparent disparities reflected neither an arbitrary nor a racially 
discriminatory application of the penalty, as the death sentences 
imposed in each case were based upon evidence developed in support 
of aggravating circumstances.33 
After leaving the Court, Justice Powell reversed his thinking on the 
death penalty and stated, in reflection, that he regretted his vote in 
McCleskey v. Kemp.34 Later, Justice Blackmun, who had voted to 
uphold the death penalty in Furman,35 while disclaiming his personal 
support for capital punishment,36 finally came to reject the use of death 
                                                                                                   
28 Id. at 310–14 (White, J. concurring). 
29 There is nothing original in this analysis, of course. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & 
Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1 (1995) (criticizing the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence). It 
seems highly unlikely that the authors would not find developments since their 
article’s publication to have compounded the problems they identified. 
30 Furman, 408 U.S. at 448–59 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 245–57 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
31 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
32 Id. at 286–92. 
33 Id. 
34 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 
(2001); Mark A. Graber, Judicial Recantation, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 807, 807 
(1994) (“Had Justice Powell seen the light while on the bench, the Supreme 
Court would have dealt a crippling blow to the death penalty in McCleskey.”). 
35 Furman, 408 U.S. at 405. 
36 Id. at 405–06, 414. 
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in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins.37 
Discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, he observed: 
Despite this staggering evidence of racial prejudice infecting 
Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme, the majority turned its back 
on McCleskey’s claims, apparently troubled by the fact that 
Georgia had instituted more procedural and substantive safeguards 
than most other States since Furman, but was still unable to stamp 
out the virus of racism.38 
Concluding that he could no longer attempt to find a rational means for 
the fair enforcement of capital punishment, Justice Blackmun authored 
a dramatic reversal from his position in Furman, concluding with this 
simple indictment of the system of capital punishment: “The basic 
question—does the system accurately and consistently determine 
which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be answered in the 
affirmative.”39 
The defections of Justices Powell and Blackmun from support for 
the continued use of the death penalty offered dramatic responses from 
judges charged with enforcing constitutional protections and applying 
them to the problems posed by the varied, troubling contexts in which 
relief is denied and executions proceed. Had they voted with the 
plurality in Furman, the past thirty-five plus years of capital litigation 
might have been avoided, as their votes would have apparently 
provided five solid votes against the death penalty. Instead, Justice 
Blackmun took a position consistently examining capital cases for 
procedural error and unfairness. In doing so, he contributed to a 
middle road on the death penalty within the Court that helped shape 
the constitutional requirements for capital sentencing, while never 
repudiating the death penalty as an acceptable punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.40 
                                           
37 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 1154. 
39 Id. at 1145. 
40 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American 
Law Institute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 353, 354 (2010) (discussing the American Law Institute’s decision 
to withdraw provisions relating to capital sentencing from the Model Penal Code 
due to its perception of the “intractable and structural obstacles to ensuring a 
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment” in noting 
Justice Blackmun’s ultimate conclusion rejecting capital punishment as an 
acceptable sentencing option in light of his experience on the Court). 
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The reconsiderations of Justices Powell and Blackmun, Furman 
dissenters, have been joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and 
John Paul Stevens, both of whom questioned the fairness of the death 
penalty without formally withdrawing support while still members of 
the Court. Justice O’Connor’s delivered her initial criticism to a group 
of Minnesota women lawyers in Minneapolis in July 2001, raising the 
questions about the likelihood of executions of innocent defendants 
and inadequate representation in capital cases.41 She left the Court, 
however, without formally changing her position on the death penalty. 
Justice Stevens delivered his criticism of the death penalty in his 
remarks to the American Bar Association at its annual meeting in 
Chicago on August 6, 2005.42 He noted “serious flaws” in the 
implementation of capital punishment, suggesting concern over the 
appointment of a new Justice following the resignation of Justice 
O’Connor.43 He offered extensive criticism of continuing reliance on 
capital punishment in Baze v. Rees,44 including its potential for 
disparate impact based upon the offender’s race noting, “A third 
significant concern is the risk of discriminatory application of the 
death penalty. While that risk has been dramatically reduced, the Court 
has allowed it to continue to play an unacceptable role in capital 
cases.”45 Assessing the weakening logical and historical support for 
the death penalty, he concluded: 
                                           
41 See Alan Berlow, A Supreme Court Shocker, SALON.COM (July 4, 2001, 10:14 
PM), http://www.salon.com/2001/07/04/oconnor. Justice O’Connor’s address 
prompted an editorial in the New York Times that observed that her criticism 
suggested that she might be open to a reconsideration of the fundamental 
fairness of capital punishment, particularly in light of her disclosure that ninety 
death row inmates had been exonerated since 1973, including six the preceding 
year. Op-Ed., Justice O’Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at 
A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/05/opinion/justice-o-connor-on-
executions.html. See also Editorial, Second Thoughts, WASHINGTON POST, July 
4, 2001, at A18. For a different, and highly critical view of Justice O’Connor’s 
expressions, see Edward Lazarus, Justice O’Connor’s Death Penalty Regrets—
and Responsibility, FINDLAW (July 10, 2001) http://writ.news.findlaw.com
/lazarus/20010710.html (criticizing O’Connor’s decisions upholding limitations 
on federal habeas review of state court capital punishment decisions). 
42 Gina Holland, Justice Stevens Criticizes Death Penalty, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.fadp.org/news/SPI-20050808.htm. 
43 Id. 
44 553 U.S. 35, 72, 84–86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgement). 
45 Id. at 85. 
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In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in 
Furman on his extensive exposure to countless cases for which 
death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on my own 
experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the 
death penalty represents “the pointless and needless extinction of 
life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or 
public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State 
[is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative 
of the Eighth Amendment.”46 
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment rather 
than rejecting capital sentencing as a matter of Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment dictate as Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas did in 
Furman, as Justice Blackmun did in Callins v. Collins, or as Justice 
Powell did after his retirement.47 
IV. REDRAWING THE MAP OF CAPITAL SENTENCING: STATE 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
The problems in administering capital sentencing, including its 
fiscal costs, have prompted a number of States to abolish the death 
penalty despite its continuing viability as a constitutionally acceptable 
punishment option for the most heinous of offenses.48 New Jersey,49 
                                           
46 Id. at 86 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (White, J., concurring)). 
47 For scholarly assessments of Justice Stevens’ evolving position on capital 
punishment, see Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s 
Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783 (2010), and 
James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens and 
the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2006). 
48 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2009: YEAR END REPORT 
(Dec. 2009), available at http: //www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009
YearEndReport.pdf. 
49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11–3 (West 2007) (repealing death penalty sentencing 
provision in homicide statute). In State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133, 1139–41 (N.J. 
2009), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a defendant, convicted of 
capital murder, could be sentenced under the life without parole mandatory 
sentence authorized under the amended statute, but only if the State could prove 
that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances. Such a 
finding would have resulted in a death sentence under the former provision, 
whereas under the amended statute, the court is able to impose the less onerous 
sentence of life imprisonment. See Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, sec. 1, 2007 
N.J. Laws 1427 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 2008)). If the 
State failed to meet its burden however, the defendant would be subject to a life 
sentence with a possible thirty-year parole disqualifier, which remains available 
under the former statute. Fortin, 969 A.2d at 1134. In this way, the majority 
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New Mexico,50 Illinois,51 and Connecticut52 have legislatively rejected 
further reliance on capital sentences to address murder, while in other 
states significant legislative debate has failed to result in repeal of 
                                                                                                   
sought to avoid the ex post facto claim resting on the imposition of a retroactive 
sentence voided by intervening legislative action, an approach sharply criticized 
by dissenting Justice Albin, joined by Justice Long. Id. at 1141 (Albin, J., 
dissenting). They maintained that the majority’s decision violated the ex post 
facto protections afforded by both the United States and New Jersey 
Constitutions. Id. at 1142. 
50 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1 (setting out capital sentencing procedure), 
repealed by An Act Relating to Capital Felony Sentencing, ch. 11, §§ 1–7, 2009 
N.M. Laws 133. The repeal of the State’s capital sentencing statute applied the 
change in the law prospectively, requiring the New Mexico Supreme Court to 
consider what procedure would apply to capital prosecutions pending at the time 
of the effective date of the amendment for which death sentences could still be 
imposed. In re Death Penalty Sentencing Jury Instructions, 222 P.3d 673 (N.M. 
2009); In re Death Penalty Sentencing Jury Rules, 222 P.3d 674 (N.M. 2009). In 
a pre-repeal case, State v. Fry, the court had rejected a challenge to the State’s 
capital sentence process on the ground that the jury sentencing procedure did not 
require jurors to find first that proven aggravating circumstances outweighed 
mitigating ones before they could impose a sentence of death. 126 P.3d 516, 
531–32 (N.M. 2005). After the repeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued a 
procedural rule that permitted capital defendants to elect to have separate juries 
empanelled for the guilt/innocence phase of trial and the capital-sentencing 
phase in the event of conviction. 222 P.3d 674, 674–75 (citing NMRA, Rule 5-
704(A)). 
51 An Act Concerning Criminal Law, § 10, 2010 Ill. Laws 7779 (codified as 
amended at 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/119-1 (West 2012) (“Beginning on the 
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly, 
notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and 
a sentence to death may not be imposed.”)). See also Christina McMahon, 
Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 PUB. INT. L. REP. 83 (2011) (discussing 
political pressure stemming from cases of actual death row inmate innocence 
and other factors influencing the legislative decision to repeal death penalty). 
52 An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, §§ 1–6, 2012 Conn. Legis. 
Service. P.A. 12-5 (S.B. 280) (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 53a-46a (2012)). However, Connecticut only abolished the death penalty 
prospectively. Id. at § 5(a) (“A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death 
for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012 under the provisions of 
section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012 only if a hearing is held in 
accordance with the provisions of this section.”). The prospective law’s 
prospective effect exempted eleven men who were on death row, “including 
Joshua Komisarjevsky and Steven J. Hayes, the men convicted of the Petit 
murders.” Peter Applebome, Death Penalty Repeal Goes to Connecticut 
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12
/nyregion/connecticut-house-votes-to-repeal-death-penalty.html. 
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capital sentencing.53 The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
State’s death penalty statute could not be constitutionally applied in 
decisions rendered in 200454 and 2007,55 because the “deadlocked 
jury” instruction, deemed critical to the operation of the sentencing 
process, was found to be constitutionally flawed.56 The legislature has 
failed to adopt an amendment to the capital sentencing process 
designed to address the court’s reasoning in these decisions. 
Meanwhile, the jurisdictions most actively relying on the death penalty 
                                           
53 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 40, at 362 n.70 (collecting news reports of 
repeal failures in New Hampshire, Montana, and Kansas within the past four 
years). 
54 People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). 
55 People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984 (N.Y. 2007) (applying LaValle to vacate 
death sentence imposed at trial). 
56 In LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 356–66, the court held that the “deadlocked jury” 
instruction included in the capital sentencing statute was fatally flawed. The 
statute required the jury be instructed that in the event it could not reach a 
unanimous sentencing decision, “the court will sentence the defendant to a term 
of imprisonment with a minimum term of between twenty and twenty-five years 
and a maximum term of life.” Id. at 356 n.9 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROV. L. 
§ 400.27(10) (2004)). The court explained the flaw in this statutorily mandated 
instruction: 
Like some other states with death penalty statutes, New York 
recognized that jurors should know the consequences of a 
deadlock. However, New York’s deadlock provision is unique in 
that the sentence required after a deadlock is less severe than the 
sentences the jury is allowed to consider. No other death penalty 
scheme in the country requires judges to instruct jurors that if they 
cannot unanimously agree between two choices, the judge will 
sentence defendant to a third, more lenient, choice. 
Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). The instruction, as 
written and required to be given, would at least theoretically influence a capital 
jury to reach a sentencing verdict in order to avoid the possibility that the trial 
judge would impose a more lenient sentence than the death or life without parole 
options authorized by statute, and available only to juries upon conviction for 
capital murder. Later, in Taylor, the court rejected the argument that it should 
simply “rewrite the deadlock instruction,” concluding that “the death penalty 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and it is not within our power to 
save the statute.” 878 N.E.2d at 983–84. It held that LaValle compelled that 
Taylor’s death sentence be vacated, noting, “[t]he Legislature, mindful of our 
State’s due process protections, may reenact a sentencing statute that is free of 
coercion and cognizant of a jury’s need to know the consequences of its choice.” 
Id. at 984. 
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as a punishment option continue to impose capital sentences while the 
actual rate of execution remains relatively low.57 
The reality of capital sentencing is that the Court’s attempt to 
direct development of a process that ensures fair application of the 
death penalty fails to satisfy both proponents and opponents of capital 
punishment. In operation, the costs and flaws in the system have 
frustrated Justices Powell, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens, all of 
whom found no Eighth Amendment prohibition in its use and who 
struggled with the Court’s mechanism to ensure fairness. For thirty-
five years, since the Court’s action in upholding post-Furman type 
legislation in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek,58 the Court’s review of 
process either has failed individual cases, or has failed to address the 
concerns of Justices Stewart and White. The experience, insight, and 
wisdom of those Justices who have examined the reality of capital 
punishment should not be dismissed, nor should the concern expressed 
by Justice Scalia in Walton be disregarded. For the reality of capital 
punishment in practice demonstrates its failure as a matter of policy. 
V. LIBERALS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE COURT’S CURRENT POSTURE 
It is clear that not a single member of the current Court is 
committed to ending capital punishment,59 whether as a matter of 
evolving notions of decency that find the death penalty cruel and 
unusual, either due to the difficulty in administering capital 
punishment consistent with the promise of due process, or simply 
based on the enormous costs in expending necessary fiscal or judicial 
resources. The apparent consistent support for capital punishment 
among current members of the Court may reflect an interesting reality 
                                           
57 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, as of November 7, 2012, 
3,170 inmates reside on death row in state and federal prisons; 1313 executions 
have been performed since 1976 when the Court upheld post-Furman capital 
sentencing statutes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek; and a total of thirty-six 
executions have been performed in 2012 alone. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1–3 (2012), available at http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
58 See cases cited supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
59 See, e.g., Parker v. Mathews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012) (per curiam and without 
dissent) (reversing grant of habeas relief from death sentence in a case nearly 
thirty years old). 
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of American political life, the concern among national Democratic 
leaders that they not be viewed by the public as “soft on crime.”60 
This was a perception often linked to the 1988 presidential 
campaign when the Democratic nominee, former Massachusetts 
Governor Michael Dukakis, was subject to this criticism.61 Governor 
Dukakis was linked to a television ad featuring Willie Horton, a 
Massachusetts inmate who committed a violent crime while on 
furlough from a state prison under a program supported by the 
Governor.62 A retrospective assessment of the Governor’s troubling 
anti-capital punishment position reports: 
In 1988, a question about rape and capital punishment tripped up 
Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis. 
Dukakis was asked during a nationally televised debate with 
Republican George H. W. Bush whether he’d still oppose the death 
penalty if his wife were raped and murdered. 
His unemotional, dispassionate answer was ridiculed, and gave 
Republicans more material to paint him as an emotionless 
liberal.63 
As a presidential candidate, then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, 
apparently learned from the mistake made during the unsuccessful 
Dukakis race in 1988. During the campaign, Clinton interrupted his 
schedule to return to Arkansas to oversee the execution of Rickey Ray 
                                           
60 The change in Democratic policy was noted by John Nichols, No Longer 
Pushing the Death Penalty, THE NATION (July 27, 2004, 6:28 AM), 
http://www.thenation.com/blog/no-longer-pushing-death-penalty (discussing an 
apparent policy shift away from support for capital punishment during the 2004 
presidential campaign of United States Senator John Kerry, and noting that both 
former President Bill Clinton and 2000 Democratic nominee Al Gore had 
endorsed Democratic platforms that explicitly and frequently endorsed capital 
punishment). 
61 Robin Toner, Prison Furloughs in Massachusetts Threaten Dukakis Record on 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, (July 5, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/05/us
/prison-furloughs-in-massachusetts-threaten-dukakis-record-on-crime.html. 
62 See, e.g., The :30 Second Candidate: Willie Horton (Wisconsin Public 
Television broadcast 1988), available at http://www.pbs.org/30secondcandidate
/timeline/years/1988b.html. The ad opens with photos of then Vice-President 
George H.W. Bush and Governor Dukakis, 1988 U.S. presidential candidates, 
comparing their pro and anti-death penalty positions. Id. 
63 McCain, Obama Disagree with Child Rape Ruling, MSNBC.COM (June 26, 
2008, 1:26 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25379987. 
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Rector,64 whose capacity to understand his pending execution had been 
challenged based on a severe brain injury from a self-inflicted gunshot 
wound.65 President Clinton would go on to appoint two Justices to the 
Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.66 
Later, in Buck v. Thaler, Justice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s 
statement regarding the denial of certiorari in a case in which the 
capital defendant failed to challenge his death sentence due to damning 
expert testimony.67 A psychologist was allowed to render an opinion 
that the defendant posed a greater threat to commit acts of violence in 
the future as a result of his race because defense counsel had opened 
up the issue during his direct examination in the capital sentencing 
hearing.68 Justice Alito explained that the introduction of this evidence 
before the jury would have constituted constitutional error, but for the 
fact that Buck’s own attorney had elicited the expert’s opinion.69 
Justice Ginsburg voted to deny certiorari, but did not join Justice 
Alito’s statement. 
Similarly, then-Senator Barack Obama, while campaigning during 
the course of the 2008 presidential campaign, aligned himself with the 
dissenting opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana, where the Court struck 
down a statute authorizing imposition of the death penalty for a limited 
class of rapes involving child victims,70 thereby establishing his “not 
soft on crime” credential: 
                                           
64 Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty: Arkansas Execution 
Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-campaign-death-penalty-arkansas-
execution-raises-questions-governor-s.html (“After shooting Officer Martin, Mr. 
Rector turned the gun on himself, destroying part of his brain. His lawyers said 
that even though he could speak, his mental capacities were so impaired that he 
did not know what death is or understand that the people he shot are not still 
alive.”). 
65 Rector v. Clinton, 823 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Ark. 1992). 
66 Supreme Court Nominations: Confirmed, LIBR. OF CONG. (July 19, 2012), http:
//www.loc.gov/law/find/court-confirmed.php. 
67 132 S. Ct. 32 (2011) denying cert. in 452 F. App’x 423 (5th Cir. 2011), 
temporarily staying execution, 132 S. Ct. 69 (2011), denying cert. to 5th Cir., 
130 S. Ct. 2096 (2010). 
68 132. S. Ct. at 33–34 (statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (Alito, J., 
joined by Scalia & Breyer, JJ.) 
69 Id. at 37. 
70 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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I have said repeatedly that I think that the death penalty should be 
applied in very narrow circumstances for the most egregious of 
crimes,” Obama said at a news conference. “I think that the rape of 
a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime and if a state 
makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined 
circumstances the death penalty is at least potentially applicable, 
that that does not violate our Constitution.71 
In fact, Louisiana referred to the consistent statements made by 
Senators Obama and John McCain, the Republican nominee, in 
support of the child-rape death penalty sentencing provision in its brief 
to the Court.72 
In Buck, President Obama appointees Justices Sonia Sotomayor 
and Elena Kagan, dissented, but not in opposing the use of the death 
penalty, generally.73 Rather, they favored review on procedural 
grounds, concerned about claims that Texas had misrepresented the 
record in the court below.74 
An irony exists, whether substantial or superficial, in the fact that it 
is Republican appointees to the Court, Justices Blackmun, Powell, 
O’Connor, and Stevens, who have either repudiated capital sentencing 
or offered significant criticisms of the capital sentencing process; 
appointees who might logically have been expected to persist in 
restrained, conservative views on the death penalty, rather than the 
presumably more liberal appointees of Democratic Presidents Clinton 
and Obama. And perhaps the ultimate irony lies in President Gerald 
Ford’s appointment of John Paul Stevens to the Court as the successor 
to Justice William O. Douglas, whom Ford had sought to impeach 
while serving as House Minority Leader in 1970.75 Justice Stevens’ 
penetrating indictment of capital sentencing in his concurring opinion 
in Baze v. Rees76 reflected his experience in reviewing a process in 
                                           
71 MSNBC.COM, supra note 63. 
72 Lyle Denniston, Final Brief on Kennedy v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24, 
2008, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/09/final-brief-on-kennedy-v-
louisiana/. 
73 See 132 S. Ct. at 35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Kagen, J.). 
74 Id. at 36–37. 
75 Professor Michael Dorf offers a very thoughtful analysis of the changing 
perspectives of some serving justices whose orientation was that of 
“Rockefeller,” or of moderate Republicans before their appointment to the 
Court. See Michael C. Dorf, Becoming Justice Stevens: How and Why Some 
Justices Evolve, FINDLAW (Apr. 21, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf
/20100421.html. 
76 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
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which procedural protections for capital defendants have eroded over 
time, in which racial prejudice remains a compelling problem 
characterized by juries unreflective of the community from which they 
have been drawn, in which unjustified costs are imposed on judicial 
and fiscal resources, and in which justice is compromised by the 
potential for the wrongful execution of innocent defendants.77 
It may be, of course, that significant Court-imposed limitations on 
the use of the death penalty in cases of rape,78 the severely mentally 
impaired,79 and for capital offenses committed by juveniles80 have 
addressed the primary concerns of liberals, including Democratic 
appointees to the Court, allowing capital punishment to remain a 
viable sentencing option. Or, it may be that the Clinton and Obama 
appointees were carefully vetted to determine that they shared their 
appointing President’s support for capital sentencing. Regardless, to 
date, none of the four Democratic appointees have veered beyond 
recognition that the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishments does not preclude capital punishment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the current Court’s position on capital punishment generally 
reflects unanimous support for the death penalty as a sentencing 
option, recent polling data shows that public support for capital 
punishment has decreased. A Gallup Poll in October 2011, for 
instance, shows that support for the death penalty has declined to 
sixty-one percent of individuals surveyed, the lowest level of support 
for capital punishment since the time of the Court’s decision in 
                                           
77 Id. at 71, 81–86 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, while criticizing use 
of the death penalty, concurred in the judgment only, rejecting the specific issue 
before the Court regarding the argument that the lethal injection protocol used in 
Kentucky violated the Eighth Amendment protection against cruelty in the 
infliction of punishment. 
78 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding Louisiana statute 
authorizing death sentence for rape of a child with aggravating factors 
unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding death penalty 
disproportionate for crime of rape of an adult woman). 
79 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). 
80 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2005). 
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Furman in 1972; at that time, just forty-nine percent of individuals 
surveyed supported the death penalty (see inset).81 
Copyright © 2011, Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. Used here with permission. Gallup retains all rights of republication. 
The trend in support for the death penalty over the period of time 
surveyed shows significant fluctuation, perhaps reflecting public 
perceptions of the fairness or factual accuracy in the prosecution 
process. It may also reflect public response to perceptions about a 
reduction in the prevalence of violent crime. Regardless, the trend 
suggests that capital punishment remains an unresolved source of 
anxiety with respect to the operation of the criminal justice system. 
The notion that execution violates the Eighth Amendment has less 
currency now than forty years ago, when a significant coalition of 
Supreme Court Justices found compelling, though varying, flaws in 
the capital sentencing system. The nation’s experience, and the Court’s 
experience, in addressing the problems posed by the death penalty 
remains an unsettling problem that will only be addressed over time by 
state legislatures. 
                                           
81 Frank Newport, In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low, 
GALLUP (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/Support-Death-
Penalty-Falls-Year-Low.aspx. 
 
